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Contract Law. Rhode Island Council on Postsecondary Education
v. Hellenic Society Paideia – Rhode Island Chapter, 202 A.3d 931
(R.I. 2019). Parties agreed to arbitrate claims of breach where
arbitration provision provides that “any controversy, claim or
dispute” 1 be arbitrated where breach is mentioned in a preceding
provision regardless of a “[r]emedies” provision, which entitles an
aggrieved party to “all rights and remedies allowed at law.” 2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 2005, the University of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island
Board of Governors for Higher Education 3 (Plaintiffs) agreed to
lease a portion of the University’s Kingston campus to the Rhode
Island Chapter of Hellenic Society Paideia (Defendant), who would
then build a center for the Hellenic Studies Program at the
University. 4 In 2012, after the ground was excavated and the
foundation laid, construction came to a halt and never resumed.5
In November of 2012, Plaintiffs sent a Notice of Default and
Termination of Ground Lease to the Defendant notifying Defendant
of Plaintiff’s intent to terminate the lease because the building had
not been finished within thirty months of beginning construction,
as provided for in the lease.6 In June of 2013, Plaintiffs sent a
second letter, demanding the Defendant restore the land to its
previous condition. 7

1. R.I. Council on Postsecondary Educ. v. Hellenic Soc’y Paideia – R.I.
Chapter, 202 A.3d 931, 936 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id. at 938.
3. The Rhode Island Council on Postsecondary Education is a public
corporation holding legal title to all property owned by the University of Rhode
Island. Id. at 933 n.1.
4. Id. at 933.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 933-34.
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After years of unsuccessful negotiation between the parties,
Plaintiffs brought a petition in the Superior Court to appoint a
special master to resolve the parties’ dispute.8 Shortly thereafter,
Plaintiffs amended their complaint seeking a declaratory judgment
that Defendant breached the lease by not completing construction
within thirty months. 9 As a consequence of the breach, Plaintiffs
sought an order that the Defendant either restore the land to its
previous condition or that Defendant reimburse Plaintiffs the cost
of doing the same. 10 Pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws
section 10-3-3, Defendant moved for a stay of litigation pending
arbitration, arguing that Section 14.3 of the lease required the
parties to arbitrate their disputes. 11 Section 14.3 reads, in
pertinent part:
14.3 Conciliation; Arbitration.
14.3.1 Conciliation – In the event of any controversy, claim
or dispute arising out of or relating to this Lease or with
respect to any breach hereof, the parties shall seek to
resolve the matter amicably through mutual discussion
....
14.3.2 Arbitration – If the parties fail to resolve any such
controversy, claim or dispute by amicable arrangement and
compromise within the thirty (30) day period immediately
following the date of the notice initiating such discussions
referred to in subsection (a) above . . . the aggrieved party
shall submit the controversy, claim or dispute to
arbitration . . . . 12
The hearing justice found that the language of Section 14.3 of
the lease “did not mandate arbitration in this case” and denied
Defendant’s motion for a stay of litigation.13 In reaching that
decision, the hearing justice noted that while the conciliation clause
referred to “any controversy, claim or dispute arising out of or
relating to this Lease or with respect to any breach hereof,” the
8. Id. at 934.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 935–36.
13. Id. at 934.
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arbitration clause did not include “with respect to any breach
hereof.” 14 Therefore, according to the hearing justice, the difference
between the two clauses created a limitation on the arbitration
clause; and because the arbitration clause did not include the
language “with respect to any breach hereof,” the parties did not
intend to arbitrate issues of alleged breach.15 After making that
finding, the hearing justice denied Defendant’s motion for a stay of
litigation. 16 In response, Defendant moved for reconsideration of
the order, but the hearing justice affirmed his previous ruling.17
Subsequently, Defendant timely appealed, arguing that the
hearing justice erred by concluding that the arbitration clause in
the lease did not apply to an alleged breach.18
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Before reaching the merits of whether the parties’ dispute was
arbitrable, the Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court) addressed
Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendant’s appeal was not properly
before the Court. 19 Plaintiffs argued that an order denying a
motion to stay litigation is not a final order until the issue is
arbitrated, thus only reviewable by writ of certiorari. 20 However,
any party aggrieved by any ruling or order . . . may obtain
review as in any civil action, and upon the entry of any final
order provided in § 10-3-3 . . . he or she may appeal to the
supreme court as provided for appeals in civil actions.21
In the Court’s view, of particular importance in the statute is the
phrase “any [aggrieved] party” may appeal “any ruling”. 22 The
Court found that the Defendant here was aggrieved when the trial
court denied Defendant’s motion to stay litigation pending
arbitration once the trial court found no arbitrable issue. 23
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 936.
Id.
Id. at 934.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 934–35.
Id. at 935.
Id. (citing 10 R.I. GEN LAWS § 10-3-19).
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
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Therefore, the Court held that the language of section 10-3-3 was
intended to allow direct appeals from orders on motions to stay
litigation brought under the statute. 24 Accordingly, Defendant’s
appeal was properly before the Court.25
The Court next turned to the issue of whether the alleged
breach was arbitrable. 26 The Court viewed the central issue as
determining whether the parties “agreed to arbitration in clear and
unequivocal language.” 27 The Court turned to the language of
Section 14.3 of the lease itself. 28 The Court noted that, in finding
breach was not an arbitrable issue, the hearing justice must have
determined the “[c]onciliation” and “[a]rbitration” clauses were in
conflict with one another, and therefore applied the “specific over
general” rule to determine which clause would apply to allegations
of breach.29 The Court reasoned that the hearing justice’s result
would follow when looking at the “Conciliation” and “Arbitration”
provisions separately. 30 However, the Court noted that reading the
two provisions separately was error, reasoning that “in ascertaining
what the intent [of the parties] is [the Court] must look at the
instrument as a whole and not some detached portion thereof.” 31
The Court held that Section 14.3.1 of the lease required the parties
to put in a good faith effort to settle “any controversy, claim or
dispute arising out of or relating to this Lease or with respect to any
breach hereof.” 32 Then, the Court explained the process of
conciliation, which, under the agreement, required discussions

24. Id. (quoting Harvard Pilgrim Health Care of New England, Inc. v.
Gelati, 865 A.2d 1028, 1037 (R.I. 2004) (“When the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, we must enforce the statute as written by giving the
words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning.”)).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting State Dep’t of Corr. v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 866 A.2d
1241, 1247 (R.I. 2005)).
28. Id. at 935–36.
29. When two contractual provisions are irreconcilable with one another,
the specific provision is considered an exception to the more general provision
and the specific provision must apply. Id. at 936 (citing Park v. Ford Motor
Co., 844 A.2d 687, 694 (R.I. 2004)).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 934, 936 (quoting Hill v. M. S. Alper & Son, Inc., 256 A.2d 10, 15
(R.I. 1969)).
32. Id. at 937.
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between the parties via telephone or in person meetings.33
However, should those conciliation efforts fail, the arbitration
clause would be engaged.34
Additionally, the Court noted Section 14.3.2 starts with “[i]f the
parties fail to resolve any such controversy, claim or dispute . . . .” 35
Despite Section 14.3.2 making no specific mention to allegations of
breach, the Court found that by using the word “such,” 36 the
arbitration provision must refer to the conciliation provision
immediately before it, which did refer to breach. 37 The Court found
that when Section 14.3.1 and Section 14.3.2 are read together, the
two provisions created a two-step process for resolving disputes.38
Accordingly, in the Court’s view, the two provisions could be read
to avoid conflict with one another, and the “specific over general”
rule did not apply.39
Plaintiffs also argued that even if Section 14.3 requires the
parties to arbitrate allegations of breach, Section 10.2.1 40 gave
Plaintiffs the option to litigate disputes if they so chose. 41 Section
10.2.1 provides that in the event of default, “[l]andlord may
terminate this Lease upon thirty (30) days written notice to Tenant
and, in addition to any right or remedy set forth herein, shall have
all rights and remedies allowed at law or in equity or by statute or
otherwise.” 42 According to Plaintiffs, “all rights and remedies
allowed at law” includes the right to bring a civil action in court. 43
In support of their argument, Plaintiffs relied on AVCORR

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. “[T]he word ‘such’ when used in a contract or statute, must, in
order to be intelligible, refer to some antecedent, and will generally be
construed to refer to the last antecedent in the context[.]” Id. (quoting Am.
Smelting and Refining Co. v. Stettenheim, 177 A.D. 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917))
(alterations in original).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 936.
39. Id. at 936–37 (citing Park, 844 A.2d at 694).
40. Article X of the lease provides for particular remedies in the event of
default; Section 10.2 is titled “Remedies.” Id. at 938.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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Management, 44 where the Court held that, although the parties’
agreement required them to arbitrate certain issues, a “rights and
remedies” provision in that agreement gave the parties an option to
litigate disputes.45 However, the Court distinguished the present
case from AVCORR Management, noting that the arbitration clause
in AVCORR Management was limited to disputes arising only
under specific circumstances rather than the breadth of the
arbitration provision here, which provides that “any controversy,
claim or dispute” is referable to arbitration. 46 Further, the parties
in AVCORR Management specifically consented to the jurisdiction
of the Rhode Island courts in the event of “any dispute arising out
of [the] [a]greement[.]” 47 Thus, the Court held that, without
limning specific issues eligible for arbitration or consenting to the
jurisdiction of Rhode Island courts, the reservation of rights and
remedies provision here merely directed the arbitrator to have all
types of remedies allowed at law available. 48
In reaching its conclusion, the Court found of particular
importance that Section 10.2.1 used the words “rights and
remedies” together rather than using each word individually. 49
The Court explained that when used alone, “rights” would refer to
the means available to a particular party to obtain its redress,
including litigation, and “remedies” would refer only to the
particular redress that may be available for an aggrieved party. 50
However, since the words appear as “rights and remedies,” the
Court concluded that Section 10.2.1 gives an aggrieved party the
opportunity to seek redress if that party’s rights under the
44. AVCORR Mgmt., LLC v. Central Falls Det. Facility Corp., 41 A.3d
1007, 1010 (R.I. 2012).
45. R.I. Council on Postsecondary Educ., 202 A.3d at 938. Plaintiffs noted
that the title and language of the provisions in question in the instant case
contained similar language as the provisions in AVCORR Management. Id.
(citing AVCORR Mgmt., 41 A.3d at 1009).
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Id. (quoting AVCORR Mgmt., 41 A.3d at 1012).
48. Id. In reaching that decision, the Court relied on cases from the Sixth
Circuit and Massachusetts Appeals Court, both holding that rights and
remedies provisions do not render an arbitration clause meaningless. Id. at
938–39 (citing Robert Bosch Corp. v. ASC Inc., 195 Fed. App’x 503 (6th Cir.
2006) and Dixon v. Perry & Slesnick, P.C., 914 N.E.2d 97 (Mass. App. Ct.
2009)).
49. Id. at 939.
50. Id.
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agreement have been breached.51 Finding that breach was an
arbitrable dispute under the agreement, the Court held the “rights
and remedies” language gave the parties the “right” to arbitrate an
alleged breach, and provided the arbitrator may provide redress
with any appropriate remedy available at law. 52 The Court went
on to note that even if it found that Section 10.2.1 provides the
parties an option to litigate breach, the Court adheres to the United
States Supreme Court’s practice in “resolving any doubt in favor of
arbitration.” 53
After concluding that the parties intended to arbitrate claims
after attempting to resolve any disputes through conciliation, the
Court found that the parties made extensive efforts to conciliate the
dispute over the years given the extensive amount of
correspondence sent between the parties; therefore the alleged
breach was eligible for arbitration.54 Accordingly, the Court
vacated the Superior Court’s denial of stay of litigation and
remanded to enter a stay of litigation pending arbitration, as
provided by Rhode Island Law.55
Chief Justice Suttell disagreed with the Court’s holding; he
found that the absence of the phrase “or with respect to any breach
hereof” in Section 14.3.2 meant that the parties did not intend to
arbitrate allegations of breach.56 Chief Justice Suttell agreed that
the word “such” in Section 14.3.2 must have been referring back to
Section 14.3.1, but posited that the provisions under Article X
enumerate a number of remedies available in the event of default.57
Looking to the heart of the dispute between the parties, Plaintiffs
were complaining about Defendant’s failure to finish construction
within the thirty-month time frame required under the lease. 58 In
Chief Justice Suttell’s view, the lack of “with respect to any breach
hereof” in Section 14.3.2 and the language of Section 10.2.1, which
allowed for “all rights and remedies allowed at law” in the event of
default, must mean that the parties did not intend to arbitrate
51. Id.
52. Id. at 940.
53. Id. (quoting Brown v. Amaral, 460 A.2d 7, 10 (R.I. 1983)).
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing 10 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-3).
56. Id. at 941.
57. Id.
58. Id.

2020]

SURVEY SECTION

599

allegations of breach.59 Accordingly, Chief Justice Suttell found
that denial of the motion to stay litigation was appropriate and the
parties could litigate this dispute given they did not explicitly agree
to arbitrate issues of breach. 60
COMMENTARY
The Court found that the lease called for arbitration in the
event of alleged default despite the absence of clear language that
an alleged breach was an arbitrable dispute in Section 14.3.2
because it referred to Section 14.3.1, which did include the language
“any controversy, claim or dispute.” 61 In doing so, however, the
Court seems to overlook Section 10.2.1, providing for specific
remedies in the event of default, which is, after all, what the dispute
was about.62 While acknowledging that whether a party can
arbitrate a particular dispute depends on whether they intended to
arbitrate that particular dispute, the Court seems to have
overlooked the principle of looking at the entire agreement in
determining the parties’ intent. 63 It seems the Court looked at
Section 14.3.1 and Section 14.3.2 together, but ignored how those
provisions relate to Section 10.2.1. 64 Granted, the “Conciliation;
Arbitration” provisions were closer in proximity to one another than
to Section 10.2.1, but the provisions must be considered as part of
the whole document in determining the intent of the parties.65
Chief Justice Suttell highlighted that the clear language of the
arbitration provision was silent as to breach, while breach was
clearly discussed in Section 10.2.1. 66 Therefore, the parties seem
to have contemplated the possibility of breach, but left it out of
Section 14.3.2 for some reason. 67 The Court seemed to couch its
opinion on the notion that the “rights and remedies” language in
Section 10.2.1 was meant to supply the arbitrator with the remedies
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 937.
See id. at 934, 941.
See id. at 934.
See id. at 936–37, 939.
See id. at 934.
Id. at 941.
See id.
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available to provide relief, but pays no mind that Section 10.2.1’s
purpose is to address remedies in the event of default, which of
course, was the precise issue in the present dispute. 68
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that parties agreed to
arbitrate allegations of breach where the arbitration clause only
refers to breach in the immediately preceding provision, and any
rights and remedies provision thereafter is intended to direct the
arbitrator as to the proper recourse of a particular dispute, not to
provide the parties an option to litigate disputes not specifically
identified in the arbitration provision.
Jeffery Rankel

68.

See id. at 937–39.

